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Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.:'
CERCLA Response Costs Covered "As
Damages" Under Comprehensive General
Liability Insurance Policies
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1983, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
determined that the groundwater and the aquifer at the West-
ern Processing Facility2 in Kent, Washington, contained haz-
ardous waste contamination.3 Pursuant to federal Superfund
legislation,4 the EPA performed an emergency cleanup of the
contaminated site. Subsequently, the EPA identified the Boe-
ing Company,' among others,6 as both a generator and a trans-
1. 113 Wash. 2d 869, 784 P.2d 507 (1990).
2. The Western Processing Facility is a toxic dump site. Since the 1960s, three
hundred companies have dumped approximately twenty-three million gallons of waste
at the site. PUGET SOUND Bus. J., Mar. 30, 1987, § 1, at 17. Western Processing recycled
this hazardous waste for resale.
3. The Western Processing Facility, as well as the property adjoining the facility,
contained a "witch's cauldron" of ninety of the 129 "priority" contaminants listed by
the EPA as hazardous substances, including benzene, chloroform, arsenic, chromium,
lead, cadmium, mercury, zinc, cyanide, PCBs, and pesticides. PUGET SOUND Bus. J.,
Jan. 26, 1987, 1, at 1. Hazardous waste at Western Processing contaminates the soil to a
depth of sixty feet. Id. In 1983, Western Processing ranked forty-third out of the four
hundred sites listed by the EPA as the nation's most polluted sites. Id. at 2. Western
Processing is one of the top 10 sites on the federal Superfund list of hazardous waste
sites. Seattle Times, Feb. 23, 1990, at F4, col. 2. The estimated costs to clean up the
hazardous waste contamination at Western Processing and Queen City Farms, a
hazardous waste site also located in Kent, Washington, exceeds $100 million. Business
Insurance, October 1, 1990, at 1. See also Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co.,
113 Wash. 2d 869, 784 P.2d 507 (1990).
4. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657 (1988)),
as reauthorized and amended in part by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at scattered sections as 42
U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (1988)) [hereinafter CERCLA].
5. Boeing, 113 Wash. 2d 869, 784 P.2d 507. Between 1964 and 1978, Boeing is
estimated to have dumped twenty-four million gallons of toxic waste at two facilities:
Western Processing and Queen City Farms, both in Kent, Washington. Seattle Times,
Sept. 22, 1990, at Al, col. 1. Each year, Boeing generates 8.5 million gallons of toxic
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porter of the hazardous waste that contaminated and continues
to contaminate the site. Boeing reimbursed the EPA for the
clean-up costs that the agency incurred and then sought
indemnification from Aetna and its other insurers.
When the insurers refused to indemnify the company,
Boeing brought an action seeking indemnification for pollu-
tion-related expenses under the comprehensive general liabil-
ity (CGL) policy.7 The insurers defended the action by arguing
that the reimbursement of clean-up costs paid to the EPA did
not constitute damages within the meaning of the CGL poli-
cies;' therefore, according to the insurers, Boeing was not enti-
tled to indemnification.
In the landmark decision of Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty
and Surety Co., the Washington State Supreme Court deter-
mined that, under the terms of the CGL policies, the insurers
must reimburse Boeing for the expenses that the company
paid and will continue to pay to the EPA as a result of the
agency's ongoing cleanup of Western Processing.' This deci-
sion marked the first time in which a state supreme court has
found Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA)' ° clean-up costs to be covered
damages under CGL policies and, as such, sets an important
precedent." Moreover, the Boeing decision is a watershed for
state supreme court decisions; other state supreme courts are
adopting a similar analysis, rejecting the reasoning of related
waste, most of which is produced as a by-product from chemicals used to coat the
outside of airplanes. Seattle Times, Aug. 22, 1990, at D2, col. 1.
6. Other policyholders participating as plaintiffs in the Boeing case included: RSR
Corporation, Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., Davis Walker Corporation, and John
Fluke Manufacturing Company, Inc. Boeing, 113 Wash. 2d at 869-70, 784 P.2d at 507.
7. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
8. Boeing, 113 Wash. 2d at 875-76, 784 P.2d at 510.
9. Id. at 888, 784 P.2d at 516.
10. CERCLA, supra note 4.
11. Since the court's decision in Boeing, five other state supreme courts have ruled
on the issue of whether clean-up costs are damages within the terms of a CGL policy:
AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (FMC Corp.), 51 Cal.3d 807, 274 Cal. Rptr. 820, 799 P.2d
1253 (1990) (because the CGL policies did not define "damages," the term will be given
its ordinary and popular meaning); Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 555 N.E.2d 576 (Mass. 1990) (finding that the state appellate courts that have
addressed the "as damages" issue have found CERCLA clean-up costs to be covered
damages); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175
(Minn. 1990) (under Minnesota contract law, the term "damages" is ambiguous and
should be interpreted in favor of the insured); C.D. Spangler Const. Co. v. Industrial
Crankshaft and Eng'g Co., 326 N.C. 133, 388 S.E.2d 557 (1990) (concluding "damages" is
not used in a legal and technical sense within CGL policies). Contra Patrons Oxford
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois. 573 A.2d 16 (Me. 1990) (clean-up costs are not damages).
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federal court decisions and deciding the issues based on state
contract law.'2
The Boeing decision represents a typical case in the midst
of a recent explosion in environmental litigation. This explo-
sion is largely attributable to increased public awareness of
environmental hazards and the dangers posed by toxic waste
pollution."3 In 1980, Congress addressed the growing national
concern over destruction of the environment and the danger to
human health caused by abandoned and improperly managed
toxic waste dumps by enacting CERCLA. CERCLA, popularly
known as "Superfund," was enacted specifically to finance the
cleanup of inactive hazardous waste sites and to provide recov-
ery for injury to the environment.'4 Moreover, CERCLA enti-
tles federal and state governments to recover costs incurred in
the cleanup of hazardous waste sites from persons 5 responsi-
12. The court in Boeing rejected the district court's opinion in Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Ross Elec. of Washington, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (applying
Washington law). See also Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457
N.W.2d 175 (Minn. 1990) (finding in favor of coverage and rejecting Continental Ins.
Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.) (en banc),
cert denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988)); C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft
and Eng'g Co., 326 N.C. 133, 388 S.E.2d 557 (1990) (finding CERCLA clean-up costs to
be damages and rejecting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988)).
13. Broadwell Realty Services, Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 218 N.J. Super. 516,
522-23, 528 A.2d 76, 79 (1987).
Each year, millions of gallons of hazardous waste are stored, recycled, or dumped.
Avondale Indus. Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1201 (2nd Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 2588 (1990). Eventually, the toxic material seeps into lakes, streams,
and underground water. Id. Exposure to hazardous waste can cause serious health
problems, including cancer, birth defects, miscarriages, and damage to the lungs, liver,
and nervous system. Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARv. L.
REv. 1462, 1462 (1986).
Public awareness of the dangers of hazardous waste pollution increased after the
discovery of the contamination of Love Canal. At Love Canal, New York, between the
late 1920s and early 1950s, a partially dug canal was used as a dumping site for
municipal wastes and for chemical wastes generated by Hooker Chemical Co. Baurer,
Love Canak Common Law Approaches to a Modern Tragedy, 11 ENVrTL. L. 133, 135
(1980). In 1976, chemical leachates began seeping into basements of homes built on the
excavation site. Id. at 136. The pollution at Love Canal resulted in 900 damage claims
exceeding $2.5 billion for personal injuries, wrongful deaths, and diminished real
estate values. Mervack v. City of Niagara Falls, 101 Misc. 2d 68, 69, 420 N.Y.S.2d 687,
689 (1979).
14. Congress intended for the Superfund established by CERCLA to cover the
costs of cleaning up hazardous waste and damage to natural resources resulting from
hazardous waste releases. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982).
15. CERCLA defines person as "an individual, firm, corporation, association,
partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government,
State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate
body." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
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ble for the pollution.16
Polluters, faced with potential liability for the devastating
costs17 of hazardous waste cleanup, have sought indemnifica-
tion under standard business insurance policies such as the
comprehensive general liability policy. When a polluter files a
claim for coverage under its CGL policy for reimbursement of
clean-up costs paid to the EPA, the insurer may agree to
indemnify the insured or it may deny coverage on one of sev-
eral grounds.'" Generally, the insurers' first line of defense in
contesting coverage is that clean-up costs are not "damages"
within the meaning of the CGL policy. 9 Specifically, insurers
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4).
17. See Lathrop, Environmental and Toxic Tort Claims From the Insurer's
Perspective, ENVIRONMENTAL AND Toxic TORT CLAIMS, INSURANCE COVERAGE IN 1989
AND BEYOND 141, 156 (1989). The magnitude of the costs to clean up toxic pollution is
exemplified by the cleanup of hazardous waste contamination at the Rocky Mountain
Arsenal, near Denver, Colorado. United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1068
(D. Colo. 1985). As of December, 1983, the United States Army had spent
approximately $48,000,000 to clean up hazardous chemicals polluting the air, land,
groundwater, and surface water at the Arsenal. Id. Unfortunately, the estimated costs
of cleanup far exceed the amount already spent-clean-up estimates range from
$210,000,000 to $1,860,000,000. Id.
18. Before an insurer will pay the polluter, the insurer may invoke any of the
following defenses to liability:
(1) Reimbursement for clean-up costs do not constitute "damages" within
the terms of the "as damages" clause of the CGL policy;
(2) The pollution does not constitute an "occurrence" under the meaning
of the CGL policy;
(3) The pollution exclusion clause in the CGL policy precludes coverage;
(4) Pollution damage does not constitute "property damage" within the
meaning of the CGL policy;
(5) Reimbursement for clean-up costs does not constitute a "suit" against
the insured within the meaning of the CGL policy.
See Note, CERCLA Cost Recovery Suits: A Suit Against An Insured For Damages
Under A Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 14 WM. MrrcHELL L. REV. 829, 832-
33 (1988).
19. The standard coverage provision under a typical CGL policy provides:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
- Coverage A: bodily injury; or
- Coverage B: property damages
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and the company
shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured
seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or property damage,
even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent,
and may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it
deems expedient, but the company shall not be obligated to pay any claim
or judgment or to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the
company's liability has been exhausted by payment of judgments or
settlements.
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maintain that funds spent to clean up hazardous waste pollu-
tion or to comply with mandatory government cleanups consti-
tute an equitable remedy. According to insurers, equitable
remedies are not damages that insurers are obligated to pay on
behalf of the insured, even though they are "sums which the
insured ... [is] legally obligated to pay as damages."'2  Thus,
insurers argue, reimbursement for clean-up costs are not cov-
ered damages.2'
Many courts have rejected the insurer's argument and
have found CERCLA clean-up costs to be covered damages
under the "as damages" clause of CGL policies.22 However,
Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1174 (9th Cir. 1988);
see also Mraz v. American Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1327 (4th Cir. 1986);
Spurgeon, Determining The Scope of "Bodily Injury or Property Damage" Under the
Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 23 IDAHO L. REV. 379 (1986-87).
20. See Intel, 692 F. Supp. at 1174.
21. Note, supra note 18, at 846-47.
22. Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989), cert
denied, 110 S. Ct. 2588 (1990) (plain meaning of damages corresponds to the reasonable
expectations of the ordinary businessman who would not anticipate insurance coverage
to be limited to strictly legal damages); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Levolor
Lorentzen, Inc., 879 F.2d 1165 (3rd Cir. 1989) (the average person would not compare
legal and equitable remedies to define the scope of "damages"); National Indem. Co. v.
United States Pollution Control, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 765 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (because CGL
policies do not define damages, the policies do not "affirmatively" limit damages to
legal remedies); Chesapeake Util. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 704 F.
Supp. 551 (D. Del. 1989) ("damages" did not, as a matter of law, exclude environmental
clean-up costs because the technical definition of damages is not the ordinary and
accepted meaning of damages to a reasonably prudent lay person); New York v. Amro
Realty Corp., 697 F. Supp. 99 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (meaning of damages is based on
reasonable expectations of insured); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
692 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (under California law, government-mandated clean-
up costs are "damages" and thus covered under CGL policies); United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (finding the
insurer's contractual analysis and definition of damages to be "hyerpertechnical");
Centennial Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 677 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
("most courts" addressing the "as damages" issue have found environmental clean-up
costs to be "damages"); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F.
Supp. 1359 (D. Del. 1987) (adopting Delaware law under which the terms of an
insurance policy are given their "ordinary, usual meaning" in accordance with the
reasonable expectations of the insured); Township of Gloucester v. Maryland Casualty
Co., 668 F. Supp. 394 (D.N.J. 1987) (clean-up costs are damages under a CGL policy);
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (the
term "damages" includes money spent in CERCLA clean-up actions); United States v.
Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (recommendation of Special
Master adopted by district court that clean-up costs constitute "damages" under CGL
policies.); Aerojet-General Corp. v. San Mateo County Super. Ct., 211 Cal. App. 3d 216,
257 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1989), (because the term "damages" could mean either damages at
law or in equity; purchasers of CGL policies would reasonably expect to be insured if
their negligence caused injury to or loss of the use of another's property); Hazen Paper
Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 407 Mass. 689, 555 N.E.2d 576 (1990)
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many other courts have adopted the insurers' reasoning that
monetary reimbursement of clean-up costs constitutes equita-
ble relief, not legal damages, and thus, does not fall within the
"as damages" clause of CGL policies. 3 This division among the
courts, both state and federal, not only leads to increased litiga-
tion over the issue, but also leaves polluters and insurers
uncertain about their future liability for potentially crippling
clean-up costs.
To reduce litigation and settle the question of liability on
this issue, courts should quash insurers' attempts to avoid lia-
bility for pollution-related clean-up expenses insofar as their
defenses are based on the "as damages", clause of CGL policies.
(majority of the highest courts of states addressing the "as damages" issue have ruled
in favor of coverage); United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App. 579,
336 N.W.2d 838 (1983) (response costs are covered damages); Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. 1990) (Minnesota law places little
value on the distinctions between legal and equitable remedies; rather, contract law
requires ambiguous terms to be interpreted in favor of the insured); C.D. Spangler
Constr. Co. v. Indus. Crankshaft and Eng'g Co., Inc., 326 N.C. 133, 388 S.E.2d 557 (1990)
(rejecting Fourth Circuit decision in Armco, and holding that the "better reasoned"
decisions find "damages" to include CERCLA response costs); Waste Management of
Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986) (clean-up costs
are essentially compensatory damages and thus covered under CGL policies); CPS
Chemical Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 222 N.J. Super. 175, 536 A.2d 311 (1988) (rejecting
argument that monetary assessments for environmental cleanup are not "damages");
Broadwell Realty Serv's, Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 218 N.J. Super. 516, 528 A.2d
76 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1987) (coverage is consistent with both the objectively
reasonable expectations of the insured and the language of CGL policies); Aronson
Assocs. Inc. v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 99 Dauph. 446, 14 Pa. D. &
C.2d 1 (1977), ffd, 272 Pa. Super. 606, 422 A.2d 689 (1979); Boeing Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 784 P.2d 507 (1990) (under Washington law, the
average purchaser of CGL policies would reasonably expect CERCLA clean-up costs to
be covered under CGL policies).
23. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken and Co., 857 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1988) (the term
"damages in the insurance context is not ambiguous and means strictly legal damages);
Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977 (8th
Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d
1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988) (reimbursement is restitutionary
form of relief and thus not covered damages); Mraz v. American Universal Ins. Co., 804
F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986) (clean-up costs are economic losses but not damages under a
CGL policy); Varlan Ltd. v. John L. Armitage & Co., 695 F. Supp. 950 (N.D. Il. 1988)
(CERCLA response costs are not "damages," but restitutional in nature); Hayes v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 688 F. Supp. 1513 (N.D. Fla. 1988); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Rosa
Elec. of Washington, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (CERCLA clean-up costs
are an equitable remedy and thus not covered damages under CGL policies); Int'l
Minerals & Chem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 168 Ill. App. 3d 361, 522 N.E.2d 758
(1988) ("damages" do not include equitable environmental compliance action); Patrons
Oxford Mutual Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16 (Me. 1990) (response costs are not
"damages"); Jones v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 172 Mich. App. 24, 431 N.W.2d 242
(1988) (the word "damages" given its ordinary and plain meaning cannot encompass a
strictly injunctive action).
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The artificial distinction promulgated by insurers between
equitable relief and legal damages has caused needless litiga-
tion and delayed cleanup of hazardous waste pollution. The
purposes of CERCLA, specifically, deterrence of continued pol-
lution of the environment, will be better served, and the
amount of needless litigation reduced, if the interpretation of
the "as damages" clause is settled. 4
This Comment will examine the CERCLA provisions that
empower the government to clean up dangerous hazardous
waste sites and to seek reimbursement of clean-up costs from
polluters. It will then outline the standard provisions of CGL
policies, which require insurers to indemnify insureds for all
costs incurred "as damages" under the terms of the policy.
Next, the Comment will set forth the two primary methods of
interpretation employed by courts to determine whether CER-
CLA response costs are covered damages under CGL policies.
The Comment will then set forth Washington law which pro-
vided the foundation for the Washington Supreme Court's
decision in Boeing and will analyze the Boeing decision.
Finally, this Comment concludes that public policy strongly
favors coverage of clean-up costs "as damages."
II. THE CLEAN-UP MECHANISM: CERCLA
Congress enacted CERCLA to facilitate the cleanup of the
nation's abandoned or inactive hazardous waste sites.25 Unfor-
tunately, to date this purpose has not been effectuated.
24. Furthermore, companies and individuals that knowingly pollute still may be
held liable for clean-up costs under other provisions of CGL policies. CGL policies
deny coverage if the polluter "expected or intended" the pollution. Thus, if a polluter
knowingly polluted, no coverage is provided. For example, following the resolution of
the "as damages" case, Boeing again brought suit against its insurers to recover clean-
up costs at Western Processing and Queen City Farms, two of the toxic waste sites
used by Boeing. This time, the insurers defended against liability by arguing that the
CGL policy issued to Boeing exempts liability if the insured "expected or intended"
the pollution to occur. Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., No. C86-352WD,
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 21, 1990). A jury found that Boeing had neither expected nor
intended an environmental threat at Western Processing between 1964 and April, 1972.
The jury did find, however, that from January 1, 1971 through 1977, Boeing knowingly
polluted at Western Processing. Boeing, Insurers Both To Pay for Cleanup at the Sites,
Jury Decides, Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) No. 54, at 490 (Oct. 1, 1990). The jury also found
that between 1957 and 1968 Boeing did not intentionally pollute at Queen City Farms,
but that it did knowingly pollute there between 1968 and 1977. Id. Accordingly, under
the "expected and intended" clause of the CGL policy, the insurers were liable only
for the policy period during which Boeing did not knowingly pollute.
25. United States General Accounting Office Report to Congress, Hazardous
Waste Issues Surrounding Insurance Availability 37 (October 1987).
1991]
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Rather, the clean up of hazardous waste sites has been slow:
between 1980 and 1984, only ten of 538 sites on the National
Priorities List26 were actually cleaned upY This delay is due,
in part, to insufficient Congressional appropriations funding
Superfund.28 Congress provided Superfund with $8.5 billion to
finance the cleanup of hazardous waste sites;' however, the
enormous cost to clean up the abandoned and inactive sites
greatly exceeds Superfund appropriations.
In 1988, 1177 sites appeared on the EPA's National Priori-
ties List."0 With an estimated average clean-up cost of $30 mil-
lion per site, the total cost of cleaning up these sites is
currently expected to reach approximately $35 billion.3l More-
over, if 27,000 tentative sites are added to the National Priori-
ties List in the future, the cost may escalate another $810
billion.32 Clearly, Superfund alone cannot finance the cleanup
of all potential National Priorities List sites. Indeed, because
of this shortage of funds, the EPA increasingly has begun to
enforce private party cleanups or has performed the cleanups
and subsequently sought reimbursement from identified pol-
luters.33 Mandatory cleanups have led, in turn, to collateral lit-
26. CERCLA requires the EPA to compile the National Priorities List, which
identifies those hazardous waste sites requiring cleanup. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(8).
27. Lathrop, supra note 17, at 156. Since 1981, only 34 of the 1175 most
contaminated toxic waste sites were cleaned up. Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1201 (2nd Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 2588 (1990).
28. CERCLA establishes two separate funds to pay for the cleanup of hazardous
waste sites. The Post-Closure Liability Trust Fund (42 U.S.C. § 9641 (1988)) finances
cleanups at hazardous waste sites closed pursuant to CERCLA regulations. (CERCLA
§ 107(k), CERCLA § 111(j); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(k) and 42 U.S.C. § 9611(j)). The Fund is
financed by a tax on hazardous waste received at hazardous waste disposal facilities.
All other remedial actions are financed by the "Hazardous Substance Response Trust
Fund," or Superfund. (CERCLA § 111(a); 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)). Most of Superfund's
initial funding was derived from taxes on petroleum and chemical products (SARA
516(a); 26 U.S.C. § 59A (West Supp. 1987); the remainder of the funds are derived from
general revenues. (SARA 517(b), 26 U.S.C. § 9507). Superfund appropriations may only
be used to clean up sites on the National Priorities List. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(A).
29. Congress initially appropriated $1.6 billion for Superfund. However, this level
of funding proved inadequate to clean up the sites on the National Priorities List.
Thus, Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA),
increasing CERCLA funding to $8.5 billion for the five-year period ending in 1991.
General Accounting Office, Report to Congress, No. GAO/RCED-88-2, HAZARDOUS
WASTE ISSUES SURROUNDING INSURANCE AVAILABILTY 38 (1987) [hereinafter GAO
RePort].
30. Lathrop, supra note 17, at 156.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 151.
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igation as more and more polluters seek indemnification from
their insurers to cover reimbursement of clean-up costs.
Mandatory cleanups help relieve the financial burden on
Superfund. If the government proves that a potentially
responsible party exercised some control' over a hazardous
substance that threatens the public health or the environment,
the party will be held strictly liable for clean-up costs.' Under
the strict liability standard, the government need only identify
a potentially responsible party as a contributor to a hazardous
waste site to impose liability on that contributor for the
cleanup of any site.36 Thus, the government need not show
that a generator was aware that its waste contributed to a pol-
luted site before holding the generator liable for the clean-up
of that site. Moreover, all potentially responsible parties'
are jointly and severally liable for clean-up costs incurred by
the government or any other person. 9 Because of CERCLA's
provision for joint and several liability, the government can
hold one party strictly liable for all clean-up costs, irrespective
34. Because statutory definitions of the liable parties are broad, courts have
looked to the degree of the defendant's control over the disposal. Developments in the
Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1514 (1986). For example, a
party lacking legal title to land may be considered an "owner" if the party had the
authority to determine the manner in which the land was used. Id.
35. CERCLA does not expressly provide a standard of liability; instead, Congress
intended for courts imposing liability under the Act to utilize the same standard of
liability as that imposed under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, located at 33
U.S.C. § 1321 (1988). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32). Courts have interpreted this standard as
one of strict liability. See United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc.,
653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984), affd in part and vacated in part sub nom., United
States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cerL denied, 109 S.Ct. 3156 (1989);
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 590 F. Supp. 50 (W.D. Mo. 1984). See also
Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REv. at 1518. Thus,
strict liability has been judicially adopted as the standard applicable to claims under
CERCLA.
By adopting a standard of strict liability, these courts have adopted the standard
that will most effectively aid in the clean up of hazardous waste contamination. Under
a negligence standard, by contrast, the government would clean up fewer hazardous
waste sites because (1) the government would be unable to meet the burden of proving
that some responsible parties acted negligently and (2) the expense to the government
of litigating under a negligence standard would be greater than under a strict liability
standard. Id.
36. Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. at 1518.
37. Id. GAO Report, supra note 29, at 38.
38. Under CERCLA, four classes of persons may be held liable for clean-up costs.
See infra note 55.
39. GAO Report, supra note 29, at 38; Mountainspring, Insurance Coverage of
CERCLA Response Casts: The Limits of "Damages" in Comprehensive General
Liability Policies, 16 EcOLOGy L.Q. 755, 757 (1989).
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of the proportion of waste attributed to that party.40 A poten-
tially responsible party may be released from liability only if it
can establish that the release was caused solely by an act of
God, an act of war, or an act or omission by a third party;41
thus, to be relieved of liability, the responsible party essen-
tially must prove that it did not cause the release.
CERCLA provides a number of different means by which
the federal government or a private party may seek to impose
liability on responsible parties. The EPA may seek a
mandatory injunction to compel responsible parties to clean up
a contaminated site.' Alternatively, the EPA may undertake
40. Furthermore, CERCLA may be applied retroactively to impose liability
against parties who disposed of hazardous waste prior to its enactment. United States
v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983); See generally United States v. Shell Oil Co.,
605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) provides in relevant part:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person
otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of evidence that the
release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and damages resulting
from it were caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the
defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a
contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant
(except where the sole contractual arrangement arises from a published
tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common carrier by rail), if the
defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he
exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned,
taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance,
in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took
precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party
and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or
omissions; or (4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
If a potentially responsible party is named in a CERCLA action, the likelihood of
avoiding liability is extremely small. Thus, the potentially responsible parties' hopes of
limiting response costs include settling or searching out other responsible parties. The
Superfund Amendments provide that potentially responsible parties have the right to
contribution from any persons who are "liable or potentially liable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)," except that contribution is barred by nonsettling potentially responsible
parties against potentially responsible parties who have entered into settlement with
the government. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1)-(2).
42. CERCLA § 106(a) provides in relevant part:
[W]hen the President determines that there may be an imminent and
substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment
because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a
facility, he may require the Attorney General of the United States to secure
such relief as may be necessary to abate such danger or threat...
42 U.S.C. § 96 06(a).
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cleanup on its own 43 and seek reimbursement for the costs
from the responsible parties." Similar to government actions,
a private party may clean up a contaminated site and seek
recovery against Superfund.4 5 Alternatively, a private party
may forego its claim against Superfund and instead seek recov-
ery of the clean-up costs from the responsible parties.46 EPA
action against responsible parties seeking reimbursement of its
clean-up costs is most often the source of the dispute regarding
the "as damages" clause of CGL policies and, therefore, is the
focus of this Comment.
Under CERCLA section 104, the EPA is authorized to
take direct action to clean up hazardous waste sites.4 7 The
EPA may exercise this authority when a hazardous substance48
43. CERCLA § 104 provides in relevant part:
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial
threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or
substantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or
contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the
public health or welfare, the President is authorized to act, consistent with
the national contingency plan, to remove or arrange for the removal of, and
provide for remedial action relating to such hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant at any time (including its removal from any contaminated
natural resource), or take any other response measure consistent with the
national contingency plan which the President deems necessary to protect the
public health or welfare or the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
44. CERCLA § 107(a)(4) provides in relevant part:
[A]ny person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release
which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall
be liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan; or
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss
resulting from such a release.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). Any person who has incurred clean-up costs may
recover against Superfund if the costs were approved under the requirements of the
National Contingency Plan and certified by the responsible federal official. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9611(a)(2).
46. Under this private party cause of action, damages must be "necessary costs of
response" and must be consistent with the National Contingency Plan. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(B).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
48. CERCLA defines hazardous substances broadly to include toxic substances
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is released into the environment or when a release poses an
"imminent and substantial danger" to public health and wel-
fare.49 Because section 104 enables the EPA to quickly initiate
emergency clean-up efforts, this section is most often invoked
when the contamination poses a serious danger to public
health or the environment.5°
Upon the designation of a site as contaminated, the EPA
may take direct action, a response action, to clean up the desig-
nated area.51 The EPA's response action may take one of two
forms: a removal action or a remedial action. A removal
action is a short-term solution designed to correct the threat of
immediate harm.52 A remedial action results in a permanent
cleanup of a polluted site.53 Superfund finances both removal
actions and remedial actions.
After the performance of a section 104 cleanup, CERCLA
section 107 authorizes the EPA to seek reimbursement of the
designated under federal legislation. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). Specifically, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(14) defines a hazardous substance as any substance designated pursuant to 33
U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A) and 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a); any hazardous waste with the
characteristics identified under the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921; any
toxic pollutant listed under 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a); and any hazardous air pollutant listed
under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412. However, the CERCLA
definition of hazardous substances excludes oil products. In addition to substances
defined in the above Acts, the Administrator of the EPA is required to designate as
hazardous substances any other materials which, if released into the environment,
"will present a substantial danger to public health or welfare or environment." 42
U.S.C. § 9602(a).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1)(B).
50. Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1462, 1486
(1986).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a).
52. CERCLA defines a removal action as:
the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the
environment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the
threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such actions
as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of
release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the
taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or
mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment, which
may otherwise result from a release or threat of release.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).
53. A remedial action includes:
[tihose actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in
addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release
of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial
danger to present or future public health or welfare or the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).
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costs incurred.' The responsible parties from whom the EPA
may seek reimbursement for clean-up costs include generators,
transporters, and disposers of hazardous substances, as well as
owners or operators of disposal sites.' Under section 107, the
EPA may seek recovery from these responsible parties for
clean-up costs incurred or for damages for the injury to natural
resources. Specifically, under section 107(a)(4)(A), responsible
parties are liable for the costs incurred by the EPA for reme-
dial or removal actions.' Alternatively, under section
107(a)(4)(C), responsible parties are liable for damages for
injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources resulting
from a pollution release. 7  Thus, subsections (A) and (C) of
section 107(a)(4) establish separate and distinct forms of liabil-
ity. This distinction is significant in the determination of
whether response costs are damages under a CGL policy.
III. COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
POLICIES: THE "As DAMAGES" CLAUSE
Recently, the EPA has increasingly relied on its section
107(a)(4)(A) authority to finance hazardous waste cleanup by
performing the cleanup itself and subsequently seeking reim-
bursement from responsible parties.' Responsible parties, in
turn, have sought indemnification from their liability insur-
ance carriers,59 contending that CERCLA response costs are
54. 42 U.S.C. 9607(a).
55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), four classes of persons may be liable for costs to
clean up hazardous waste contamination, including:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such
person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel
owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous
substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release
which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance.
59d
56. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). See supra note 44.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C). See supra note 44.
58. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
59. Liability insurance transfers risk from parties who are risk adverse to entities
willing to bear risk. Insurance also distributes and spreads risk among parties to an
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covered by the broad terms of the CGL policies they
purchased.' Conversely, insurers contend that CGL policies
were never contemplated to provide coverage for the costs of
cleaning up such environmental damage.
Under the standard CGL policy 6l an insurer is obligated to
pay for "all sums which the insured shall become legally obli-
gated to pay as damages 2 because of bodily injury or property
damage caused by an occurrence."'6 3 Although CGL policies
define the term "property damage,"'  they do not define the
insurance contract, thereby lessening the burden of the risk on individual companies
or individuals. R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAw 2 (1971); Abraham,
Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 945-46
(1988).
60. Note, The Applicability of General Liability Insurance to Hazardous Waste
Disposal, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 757 (1984) ("The very title 'Comprehensive General
Liability Insurance' suggests the expectation of maximum coverage.").
61. The CGL policy is the standard type of insurance policy sold to businesses to
insure against damages caused by environmental pollution. E. Anderson & T. Sear,
Insurance Coverage for Environmental Liability: Technical and Legal Considerations,
ENVIRONMENTAL AND Toxic TORT CLAIMS, INSURANCE COVERAGE IN 1989 AND BEYOND
35, 42 (1989); Spurgeon, supra note 19, at 379 (the CGL policy is the most frequently
purchased insurance policy); American Home Products, 565 F. Supp. at 1500.
Since the inception of CGL policies, coverage for pollution-related harm has
undergone three distinct phases. See Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through
the Looking Glass, 74 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1241 (1986). Prior to 1966, CGL policies covered
liability caused by an "accident," a term insurers intended to include only "sudden and
unexpected" events. American Home Products Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F.
Supp. 1485, 1501 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) qffd. as modified, 748 F.2d 760 (2nd Cir. 1984).
Judicial interpretation of accident-based policies expanded coverage for pollution-
related losses from sudden and unexpected events to include coverage of harm
resulting from gradual leakage of hazardous waste. As a result, in 1966, the insurance
industry switched from "accident-based" policies to "occurrence-based" policies to limit
coverage for pollution-related losses and to combat the uncertainty of future judicial
interpretations. Note, supra, at 1246. Under the occurrence-based policies, the
insurers indemnified insureds for liablity only if the loss was unexpected and
unintended from the insured's standpoint. Id at 1247. Occurrence-based policies were
introduced before the dramatic growth in pollution-related litigation. In 1971, in
response to concerns that pollution-related claims dramatically would increase,
insurers again amended CGL policies, this time to include "pollution exclusion"
clauses that restrict coverage to pollution damages resulting from polluting events that
were "sudden and accidental." Id. at 922.
62. See supra note 19.
63. Under a CGL policy, an occurrence is defined as "an accident, including
injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in bodily
injury or property damage, neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the
insured." Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co. Ltd., 804 F.2d 1325, 1327 (4th Cir. 1986).
The general rule is that the time of the occurrence is when the party was actually
damaged. Id. at 1328.
64. Under typical CGL policies, property damage is defined as:
(a) physical injury to or destruction of tangible property, including the loss of
use thereof at any time resulting therefrom, or (b) loss of use of tangible
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term "damages" and consequently, disputes, and ultimately lit-
igation, have resulted from conflicting interpretations of the
term.
Courts faced with the task of defining the term "damages"
have been sharply divided and have reached inconsistent con-
clusions.65 In determining whether environmental response
costs constitute damages within the meaning of CGL policies,
some courts have adopted a broad, plain meaning interpreta-
tion of the term.66 Under this broad interpretation, the term
"damages" includes both legal damages and equitable mone-
tary relief. Thus, for these courts, clean-up costs are compen-
satory damages recoverable under a CGL policy. By contrast,
other courts have adopted a narrow interpretation of the term"damages."6 7  Under this narrow interpretation, the term
means only legal damages and does not include equitable mon-
etary relief. Thus, because these courts consider reimburse-
ment of clean-up costs equitable monetary relief such costs are
not recoverable under a CGL policy.
Under the latter analysis, the distinction between legal
damages and equitable monetary relief is crucial in determin-
ing whether CERCLA response costs are "damages" within the
property which has not been physically injured or destroyed, provided
such loss of use is caused by an occurrence during the policy period.
United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, Inc. 34 Wash. App. 708, 664 P.2d 1262
(1983); Spurgeon, supra note 19, at 393. A number of courts have held that federal and
state ordered cleanups of hazardous waste sites are claims for "property damage"
under the coverage provisions of CGL policies. See Port of Portland v. Water Quality
Ins. Syndicate, 796 F.2d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 1986) (discharge of pollution into water
causes damage to tangible property and thus clean-up costs are recoverable under CGL
policies); C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Indus. Crankshaft and Eng'g Co., 326 N.C. 133,
388 S.E.2d 557 (1990) (state's interest in protecting its natural resources is a form of
property right and thus injury to natural resources is property damage under CGL
policies).
65. Compare Aerojet-General v. San Mateo County Super. Ct., 211 Cal. App. 3d
216, 278, 257 Cal. Rptr. 621, 628 (1989) (response costs for cleanup of pollution were
"damages" within the meaning of the coverage clause of the CGL policy, whether or
not costs were equitable relief or damages) and Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1206-07 (2nd Cir. 1989), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 2588 (1990)
with Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 842 F.2d
977, 985 (8th Cir. 1988), (en banc) (interpreting Missouri law and holding that the plain
meaning of the term "damages" used in the CGL policies refers to legal damages and
does not cover clean-up costs), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988) and Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that "[t]he best approach
in construing the term 'damages' . .. is to afford it the legal, technical meaning..."
and holding that clean-up costs under CERCLA § 107(a) were not covered by the CGL
policy), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988).
66. See cases cited supra, note 22.
67. See cases cited supra, note 23.
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meaning of CGL policies.68 While the distinction between law
and equity is largely historical, the underlying substantive con-
cepts have been retained.69 Equitable remedies are restitution-
ary in nature and restore what rightfully belongs to the
innocent party.70  In contrast, legal damages simply compen-
sate for losses incurred by the innocent party. According to
the insurers, reimbursement of clean-up costs constitutes equi-
table monetary relief and, in the insurers' interpretation, such
equitable monetary relief is not contemplated by the term"damages."
According to insurers, and some courts, the plain meaning
of the term "damages," as understood within the insurance
industry, is very narrow and refers only to legal damages and
not equitable monetary relief.7 By contrast, those outside of
the insurance industry interpret the term "damages" broadly,
without distinguishing between legal and equitable remedies.72
68. See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken & Co., 857 F.2d 979, 981 (4th Cir. 1988) (the
term "damages" in the insurance context is not ambiguous and means legal damages);
Varlan Ltd. v. John L. Armitage & Co., 695 F. Supp. 950, 953-55 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(CERCLA response costs claims do not seek "damages," but rather restitutional
relief); Mraz v. American Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1329 (4th Cir. 1986) (clean-
up costs are economic losses but not damages under a CGL policy).
69. Courts have relied on two tests to classify an action as legal or equitable: (1)
whether the cause of action was historically considered a legal or equitable proceeding,
and (2) whether, according to the substance of the claim, the claimant seeks legal or
equitable relief. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352 (4th Cir. 1986);
Heintz, The "As Damages" Issue: A Focal Point Insurance Coverage Litigation in the
Face of Stepped-Up EPA Enforcement Activity, ENVIRONMENTAL AND Toxic TORT
CLAIMS: INSURANCE COVERAGE IN 1989 AND BEYOND, 177, 190 (1989).
In the "as damages" context, some courts have denounced the distinction between
law and equity as irrelevant:
In this context the argument concerning the historical separation of damages
and equity is not convincing and it seems to me that the insured ought to be
able to rely on the common sense expectation that property damage within
the meaning of the policy includes a claim which results in causing him to pay
sums of money because his acts or omissions affected adversely the rights of
third parties.... The short answer is that from the standpoint of the insured
damages are being sought for injury to property. It is that contractual
understanding rather than some artificial and highly technical meaning of
damages which ought to control.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139, 1168
(W.D. Mich. 1988).
70. D. Dobbs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES, 136-37 (1973).
71. Continental Ins. v. Northeastern Pharaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 985
(8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988) (citing Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352 (4th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988)).
72. Id.
1991] Boeing Co. v. Aetna
A. Coverage for Clean-up Costs: A Broad Interpretation of
the Term "Damages"
Courts holding that clean-up costs are recoverable under
CGL policies have employed one of two different analyses.
Under the first analysis, courts interpret damages in accord-
ance with the meaning the average insured would give the
term.73 Under the second analysis, courts simply deem any dis-
tinction between legal damages and equitable monetary relief
to be irrelevant.74
Courts utilizing the first method of analysis reason that
insurance contracts must be interpreted in accordance with the
meaning the average insurance purchaser would give to the
policy terms.75 Because CGL policies do not define the term
"damages" or include any specific language limiting coverage
to legal damages, these courts have turned to state contract law
to interpret the term "damages" in accordance with its plain
and ordinary meaning.76 Under the contract law of many
states, the reasonable expectations of the insured is the deter-
minative factor.77 These courts reason that the term "dam-
73. National Indem. Co. v. United States Pollution Control, 717 F. Supp. 765 (W.D.
Okla. 1989) (because CGL policies do not "affirmatively" restrict coverage to legal
damages, the plain, ordinary meaning of damages must be used); Chesapeake Utilities
Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 704 F. Supp. 551 (D. Del. 1989) (the technical
definition of damages is not the ordinary meaning); New Castle County v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Del. 1987) (under Delaware law, terms of
an insurance contract are given their "ordinary, usual" meaning in accordance with the
reasonable expectations of the insured); Aerojet-General v. San Mateo County Super.
Ct., 211 Cal. App. 3d 216, 257 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1989) (ordinary insured would expect
environmental clean-up costs to be "damages"); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. 1990) (ambiguous terms within an
insurance policy must be interpreted in favor of the insured); C.D. Spangler Constr.
Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft and Eng'g. Co., 326 N.C. 133, 388 S.E.2d 557 (1990) (the
term "damages" in CGL policies is not used in a legal or technical sense).
74. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 75 (E.D. Mich.
1987) ("coverage does not hinge on the form of relief taken or the nature of relief
sought, but on an actual or threatened use of legal process to coerce payment or
conduct by a policyholder"); see also United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 336
N.W.2d 838, 843 (Mich. App. 1983).
75. See AIU Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara County, 51 Cal.3d 807, 274 Cal.
Rptr. 820, 799 P.2d 1253, 1267 (1990).
76. See Aerojet-General, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 224-25, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 625-26.
77. New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359, 1365
(D. Del. 1987) (rejecting the "legal, technical" definition of damages and adopting
Delaware law under which the terms of an insurance policy are given their "ordinary,
usual meaning" in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured.
Because the ordinary dictionary definition of damages does not distinguish between
actions at law and equity, "damages" in CGL policies includes remedial expenses to
clean up hazardous waste contamination). The standard is the reasonable expectation
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ages" within CGL policies cannot be limited to strictly legal
damages because the insured would not reasonably expect such
a limitation on coverage. 8
In Avondale Industries, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,
the Second Circuit reasoned that, under New York law, the
terms of an insurance policy should be interpreted in accord-
ance with "the reasonable expectation and purpose of the ordi-
nary businessman."' The Avondale court affirmed a partial
summary judgment declaring that the insurer had a duty to
defend Avondale in private litigation and a public administra-
tive proceeding filed against Avondale."' The actions in
Avondale stemmed from personal injury and property damage
caused by oil and chemical waste by-products of Avondale's
operations.8 2 Because the CGL policy in question did not
include language limiting the scope of the term "damages," the
court concluded that damages must be construed to include
remedial costs of cleanup. The court noted that if an insurer
wants to exclude certain damages from coverage, the insurer
must include clear and unmistakable exclusionary language in
the CGL policy."
Other courts have looked to the insured's reasonable
expectations upon finding that, within CGL policies, the term
"damages" is ambiguous.' Generally, under contract law,
when a term is ambiguous-or open to differing interpreta-
tions-the term must be interpreted in favor of the insured.'
of the average lay insured and the standard does not vary with the sophistication of
the insured. Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 882-83, 784
P.2d 507, 514 (1990).
78. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1190 (N.D.
Cal. 1988); Aerojet-General, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 228, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 628 (1989);
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175, 181 (Minn.
1990).
According to the court in Aerojet, "[i]t would come as an unexpected, if not
incomprehensible shock, to the insureds to discover that their insurance coverage was
being denied because the plaintiff chose to frame his complaint in equity rather than
in law." Aerajet-General, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 228, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
79. 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 2588.
80. Id. at 1207 (citing Ace Wire & Cable Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 60
N.Y.2d 390, 398, 469 N.Y.S.2d 655, 658, 457 N.E.2d 761, 764 (1983)).
81. Id. at 1201.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1207.
85. See Aerojet-General v. San Mateo County Super. Ct., 211 Cal. App. 3d 216, 257
Cal. Rptr. 621 (1989).
86. 2 G. COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW § 15.83, 399 (2d ed. 1984).
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In Aerojet-General Corp. v. San Mateo County Superior
Court,8 7 the California Court of Appeals reasoned that the
term "damages" is ambiguous within CGL policies because the
term is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations: legal
damages or equitable monetary relief." The Aerojet court
reversed a summary adjudication that no portion of environ-
mental cleanup and restoration costs imposed upon the insured
by state and federal governments constituted "damages"
within a CGL policy. The court concluded that because the
term "damages" could mean either damages at law or equity,
persons purchasing a CGL policy would reasonably expect to
be insured if their negligence caused injury to or loss of the use
property.8 9
Generally, courts adopting the plain meaning analysis rea-
son that if insurers intended to exclude coverage for response
costs, CGL policies would include exclusionary language limit-
ing the scope of liability to specific types of damagesf 0 Because
CGL policies do not expressly restrict insurers' liability to legal
damages, these courts argue that a narrow interpretation of
damages is inconsistent with the language and structure of
CGL policies.
Courts that have found in favor of coverage by utilizing
the second type of analysis reason that any technical distinc-
tion between legal damages and equitable monetary relief is
irrelevant for the purpose of determining whether response
costs are covered under CGL policies.9' Focusing on the sub-
stance of government cleanup mandates and not the form of
coverage, these courts maintain that the insurer is liable for
response costs irrespective of whether the costs result from
compensation for injury to natural resources under CERCLA
section 107(a)(4)(C) or reimbursement of clean-up expenses
under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(A).92 For these courts, both
87. 211 Cal. App. 3d 216, 257 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1989).
88. Id. at 226, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
89. Id.
90. Insurers have included pollution exclusion clauses in CGL policies to limit the
insurers' liability for damage caused by a sudden and accidental polluting event.
United Pacific Ins. v. Van's Westlake Union, Inc. 34 Wash. App. 708, 664 P.2d 1262
(1983). See also supra note 61.
91. See supra note 74.
92. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. Cal.
1988); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1987);
United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 336 N.W.2d 838
(1983).
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types of costs are damages and coverage does not turn on the
"fortuitous" distinction between whether the government per-
forms the cleanup and then sues for reimbursement or
whether the government sues for compensation for the value
of environmental losses.9"
The leading case declaring the distinction between legal
damages and equitable monetary relief to be irrelevant is
United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co." In that
case, Aviex initiated a declaratory judgment action to deter-
mine an insurer's obligation to indemnify the company for the
costs incurred by the EPA in cleaning up chemical contamina-
tion caused by percolating waters beneath Aviex's property. 5
The Aviex court rejected the narrow definition of damages,'
finding that under a Michigan statute the state is empowered
to file suit to recover the value of injury to natural resources.97
Thus, the Michigan Court of Appeals reasoned that if the EPA
sued directly to recover the costs the agency incurred in clean-
ing up pollution, the insurer would be obligated to indemnify
its insured for sums the insured was legally obligated to pay.9"
Likewise, the court held that insurers are liable for response
costs when the alleged polluter undertakes a government-man-
dated cleanup and subsequently seeks reimbursement from its
insurers 9 The court concluded that because the cost of
cleanup is the cost to restore the property to its original state,
93. The court in Aview noted that:
If the state were to sue in court to recover in traditional "damages", [sic]
including the state's costs incurred in cleaning up the contamination, for the
injury to the groundwater, defendant's obligation to defend against the
lawsuit and to pay damages would be clear. It is merely fortuitous from the
standpoint of either plaintiff or defendant that the state has chosen to have
plaintiff remedy the contamination problem, rather than choosing to incur the
costs of clean-up itself and then suing plaintiff to recover those costs.
125 Mich. App. at 589-90, 336 N.W.2d at 843.
94. Id., 125 Mich. App. 579, 336 N.W.2d 838. See also Intel Corp. v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (adopting the analysis
in Aviex that the distinction between the direct payment for clean-up costs and the
reimbursement of such costs is irrelevant); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp.,
662 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1987) ("The insurers construe their policies too narrowly:
coverage does not hinge on the form of action taken or the nature of relief sought, but
on an actual or threatened use of legal process to coerce payment or conduct by a
policyholder.").
95. Aviex, 125 Mich. App. at 582-83, 336 N.W.2d at 840.
96. Id. at 589, 336 N.W.2d at 842-43.
97. Id. at 589, 336 N.W.2d at 843.
98. Id. at 589-90, 336 N.W.2d at 843. These costs are those incurred under
CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(C).
99. Id. These costs are those incurred under CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A).
[Vol. 14:311
Boeing Co. v. Aetna
the CGL policy covers clean-up costs under either cleanup
mechanism.1i °
B. No Coverage for CGean-up Costs: A Narrow Interpretation
of the Term "Damages"
Courts that have adopted a narrow interpretation of the"as damages" clause in CGL policies strictly construe the term
"damages" as legal damages.1 1 Classically, these courts distin-
guish claims for "damages" from claims for injunctive or resti-
tutionary relief, limiting damages to "'payments to third
persons when those persons have a legal claim for damages
.... 2 Insurers argue this narrow, technical definition of
the term "damages" in an effort to avoid liability under CER-
CLA section 107.103
By adopting a narrow interpretation of the "as damages"
clause, courts limit an insurers' liability under the CGL policy
to awards against the insured for money damages. Such dam-
ages include compensation for harm to natural resources under
CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(C). l °4 However, under the narrow
interpretation of the term "damages," insurers argue that they
are not liable for reimbursement of clean-up costs under CER-
CLA section 107(a)(4)(A)' 5 because, according to insurers,
that section does not provide a legal remedy.06 Instead, under
subsection (A) of section 107(a)(4), the alleged polluter reim-
burses the EPA for costs incurred in cleaning up the waste;
reimbursement, or restitution, is an equitable remedy, not a
legal remedy. Thus, under the narrow interpretation, insurers
conclude that the costs of complying with equitable remedies
are not damages under the "as damages" clause of a CGL pol-
icy, and therefore, they have no duty to indemnify the insured
100. Id. at 590, 336 N.W.2d at 843.
101. See supra note 23.
102. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352 (4th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988) (quoting Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d
499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955)).
103. Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d
977, 985-86 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988) [hereinafter "NEPACCO"];
Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352.
104. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
105. Id.
106. In NEPACCO, the court specifically distinguished between the nature of the
relief granted under § 107(a)(4)(A) and that granted under § 107(a)(4)(C): "[u]nder
CERCLA [subsection (A)] clean-up costs are not substantially equivalent to
[subsection (C)] compensatory damages for injury to or destruction of the
environment." 842 F.2d at 986.
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for claims under subsection (A)."°7
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco 0 8 and Continental Insur-
ance Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.
(hereinafter "NEPACCO")' °9 are the leading cases in which
courts held that CERCLA response costs constitute equitable
relief rather than legal damages. In Armco, the Fourth Circuit
held that claims against the insured by the government for
injunctive relief and restitution in the form of reimbursement
of clean-up costs were not claims for legal damages but were
claims for equitable relief.110 In that case, Maryland Casualty
Co. brought a declaratory judgment action against Armco. The
insurer claimed that it had no duty to defend a CERCLA suit
filed for reimbursement of costs incurred to cleanup the seep-
age of toxic chemicals into the soil and groundwater surround-
ing a hazardous waste site."' The insurer based its claim on a
narrow interpretation of the "as damages" clause.
The court in Armco adopted a narrow interpretation of the
term, drawing a distinction between legal damages and equita-
ble monetary relief.1 " 2 In adopting the narrow interpretation
of damages, the court in Armco drew upon the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Hanna."' The
court in Hanna held that the term "damages" has an "accepted
technical meaning in law" which is limited only to payments to
third persons, such as awards in suits at law against the
insured for money damages." 4 Although Armco and many
other courts rely on Hanna to define the term "damages"
within CGL policies, in fact, Hanna did not involve a claim
under a CGL policy. Rather, in Hanna, the policyholders of a
comprehensive personal liability insurance policy sued their
insurer to recover the costs of compliance with a mandatory
injunction requiring the insureds to remove rocks and dirt
from adjoining property."' The Fifth Circuit reversed the trial
107. Id. at 986-87.
108. 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988).
109. 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cr.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988).
110. Armco, 822 F.2d at 1354.
111. Id. at 1350.
112. Id. at 1352-53.
113. 224 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1955). The court in Hanna argued:
[c]learly, the policy covers only payments to third parties when those persons
have a legal claim for damages against the insured on account of injury to or
destruction of property." Id. at 502.
114. Id. at 503.
115. Id. at 501.
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court's award of damages, finding that the insurance policy did
not provide coverage for compliance with a mandatory injunc-
tion.'1 6 The insurer, the court held, was obligated "to pay,"
and not to comply with a mandatory injunction."1
The Armco court concluded that under the Hanna defini-
tion of damages, claims for reimbursement under CERCLA
section 107 (a)(4)(A) are not claims for legal damages."' This
result, the court determined, turned on the form of relief
sought, which is equitable, and not on the nature of the under-
lying action." 9 Thus, under the Hanna court's definition, resti-
tutionary relief and the cost of compliance with mandatory
injunctions by government agencies are not damages. 2 °
In NEPACCO, in a sharply divided en banc opinion, the
Eighth Circuit adopted the narrow interpretation of damages
used by the court in Armco.121 In NEPACCO, the EPA cleaned
up dioxin contamination, generated by NEPACCO at Times
Beach, Missouri. NEPACCO's insurer brought suit seeking a
declaration that the insurer had no duty to indemnify the com-
pany for the costs incurred to clean up the toxic
contamination. 122
The court in NEPACCO, unlike the court in Armco, recog-
nized that, outside the context of the insurance industry, the
term "damages" is an ambiguous term that could include both
legal and equitable remedies.1 23 Despite the court's recognition
that the plain meaning of damages may incorporate both legal
and equitable forms of relief, the court argued that, in the
116. Id. at 503.
117. Id. at 502.
118. 822 F.2d at 1352.
119. Id. at 1352; The Armco court argued that it is a "dangerous" step for courts to
construe insurance policies to include the costs of compliance with injunctive and
reimbursement relief. Id. at 1353. Insurers, the court stressed, are reluctant to insure
prophylactic measures because such expenses are subject to the insured's discretion
and are not connected with harm to third parties. Id. The Armco court held that
because the government cleaned up the waste in order to prevent harm, the costs were
prophylactic in nature, and thus, did not fall within the terms of the CGL policy. Id. at
1354.
120. Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352.
121. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988).
122. See id. at 981.
123. Id. The NEPACCO court noted that "[v]iewed outside the insurance context,
the term 'damages' is ambiguous: it is reasonably open to different constructions....
Thus, from the viewpoint of the lay insured, the term 'damages' could reasonably
include all monetary claims, whether such claims are described as damages, expenses,
costs, or losses." Id. at 985.
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insurance context, the term "damages" is not ambiguous. 24
Rather, the court concluded that "damages" in an insurance
context refers to legal damages and does not include equitable
monetary relief. 25 The NEPACCO court adopted the Hanna
definition of damages.2 6 Moreover, the court determined that
this limited construction of the term "damages" is consistent
with the statutory scheme of CERCLA which, according to the
court, differentiates between recovery for clean-up costs under
section 107(a)(4)(A) and recovery for injury to natural
resources under section 107(a)(4)(C). 127 This distinction, the
court reasoned, is critical in the determination of the insurer's
liability because CGL policies only cover legal damages, such as
injury to property, but not equitable actions for monetary
relief.128
The courts in Armco, NEPACCO, and their progeny reason
that the narrow interpretation of damages is consistent with
the language and structure of CGL policies."2 These courts
argue that under a CGL policy, the insurer is liable only for
amounts the insured becomes obligated to pay as damages; the
insurer is not liable for all sums the insured may be obligated
to pay. Consequently, these courts maintain that under an
expansive interpretation of damages, incorporating both legal
and equitable relief, the term "damages" would become "mere
surplusage" because any obligation to pay would be covered."2°
Courts like those deciding Armco and NEPACCO conclude
that a narrow interpretation of the term "damages" is essential
124. Id. at 986.
125. Id. at 985 (citing Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352.).
126. Id. at 985-86. By contrast, the dissent in NEPACCO determined that a narrow
definition of damages is inconsistent with Missouri law, which requires a reasonable-
layperson construction of insurance policies. Id. at 988 (Heaney, J, Lay, C.J., Fagg, J.,
dissenting). Under this construction, the term "damages" includes the costs of
restoring real property to its predamaged condition. Id. In addition, the dissent
criticized the majority for following the Armco decision, which concluded that the
narrow definition of damages is inconsistent with Maryland law. Id. at 989.
127. Id. at 987.
128. See id at 987.
129. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, 822 F.2d 1348, 1352 (4th Cir. 1987), cert
denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988); NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986.
130. The Armco court reasoned as follows:
If the term "damages" is given the broad, boundless connotations sought by
the [insurer], then the term "damages" in the contract between Maryland
Casualty and Armco would become mere surplusage, because any obligation
to pay would be covered. The limitation implied by employment of the phrase
"to pay as damages" would be obliterated.
Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352.
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to provide insurers with certainty regarding the extent of their
potential liability.'13 To accurately assess the risks of providing
pollution-related insurance coverage, insurers must judge the
potential liability from pollution releases. CERCLA's strict
joint and several liability provisions make response costs
highly uncertain because a responsible party may be held lia-
ble for a greater percentage of clean-up costs than the actual
proportion of waste attributed to that party. This results in a
great deal of uncertainty in estimating CERCLA liability;
therefore, according to these courts, CERCLA clean-up costs
are essentially uninsurable. Thus, these courts maintain that
insurers should not be required to provide coverage for unin-
surable costs.
The issue of whether CGL policies provide coverage for
CERCLA response costs is largely determined by a court's
adoption of either a broad or a narrow interpretation of the
term "damages." The historical distinction between legal and
equitable remedies has created these two disparate interpreta-
tions of the term "damages." Until recently, this distinction
has been a focal point of litigation in the federal courts sur-
rounding the "as damages" clause of CGL policies. Now, how-
ever, federal courts are beginning to look to state courts to
provide them with an interpretation of state law on this issue.
State courts increasingly are focusing on state contract law, as
opposed to the distinction between legal and equitable reme-
dies, to determine whether CERCLA response costs are cov-
ered by CGL policies as interpreted by state law.
IV. WASHINGTON STATE LAW
Prior to the Washington Supreme Court's recent decision
in Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., Washington law
on the "as damages" issue was sparse and divided. Two Wash-
ington trial courts held that response costs were covered by
CGL policies in Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.132 and Isaacson Corp. v. Holland-America Insurance
Co.133 In contrast, in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Ross Electric
of Washington, Inc.,'34 the United States District Court for the
131. Id. at 1353.
132. No. 86-2-06236-0 (King County Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 1987), reported in Mealey's
Litigation Reports-Insurance A-106, A-108 (Nov. 24, 1988).
133. No. 85-2-12843-5 (King County Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 1987).
134. 685 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (purporting to apply Washington law).
1991]
336 University of Puget Sound Law Review
Western District of Washington held that clean-up costs are an
equitable remedy, not a legal remedy, and thus are not covered
under a CGL policy. 35
In Queen City Farms, the insured, Queen City Farms,
sought a declaration of coverage under a CGL policy for the
cost of cleaning up hazardous materials that created an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment to public health. The King
County Superior Court denied the insurer's motion for sum-
mary judgment, holding that reimbursement to the EPA for its
cleanup of the hazardous material was covered as damages
under Queen City's CGL policies."3 The court reasoned that
the term "damages" in a CGL policy should be interpreted
according to the Washington law of insurance construction,137
which requires interpretation of an insurance policy according
to the understanding of the average insurance buyer."3
Because the average purchaser of a CGL policy would reason-
ably conclude that the policy's coverage included monies paid
to clean up pollution damage, the judge deciding Queen City
Farms concluded that CERCLA clean-up costs are covered
damages under a CGL policy. 39
Similarly, in Isaacson, the Isaacson Corporation sought
reimbursement from its insurance carrier for costs the com-
pany incurred in cleaning up contaminated soil and ground-
water on company property. The Issacson court held that the
distinction between legal and equitable remedies is irrelevant
to the issue of coverage. Moreover, it rejected the analysis
used by the courts in Armco and NEPACCO to adopt the broad
definition of damages.
Conversely, the district court in the case of Travelers
Insurance Co. v. Ross Electric of Washington, Inc.'40 adopted
the narrow interpretation of the term "damages" articulated in
Armco and NEPACCO. In Ross, land leased to Ross Electric
was contaminated by pollution from the operation of Ross's
business.141 The district court granted the Travelers' motion
for partial summary judgment, holding that CERCLA response
135. Id. at 744.





140. 685 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
141. Id. at 743.
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costs pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(A) are an equitable remedy
which is not within the class of risks insured "as damages"
under the CGL policies issued by the insurer.142 The Travel-
ers' motion presented two issues: whether CERCLA response
costs are legal or equitable remedies and whether the term"property damage" within the CGL policy in question is analo-
gous to property damage for which legal damages attach. 43
Under the first issue, the court in Ross noted that relief
under CERCLA is generally considered to be equitable in
nature. 144 Specifically, the court adopted the analysis of the
Fourth Circuit in Armco that the determinative factor in ascer-
taining whether response costs are equitable or legal damages
is based upon the form of relief sought, not the nature of the
underlying action. 145 In Ross, the court reasoned that the
response costs incurred by the insured are analogous to restitu-
tion or the reestablishment of the environmental status quo.146
By contrast, damages are traditionally viewed as a monetary
substitution for a loss in value. 47 Thus, the court in Ross con-
cluded that claims for injunctive or equitable monetary relief,
such as CERCLA response costs pursuant to CERCLA section
107(a)(4)(A), are not covered risks within the meaning of a
CGL policy.14 Under the second issue, the court argued that
the term "damages" within the CGL policy should be given its"accepted technical meaning in law," which is limited to
strictly legal damages. 49 The court in Ross concluded that
because CERCLA response costs are equitable in nature, CGL
policies do not cover such costs.15°
These divergent judicial interpretations of an insurer's lia-
bility provided a confusing and disparate legal foundation for
the Washington Supreme Court's recent decision in Boeing Co.
142. Id. at 743.
143. Id.





149. Id. at 745, (citing Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th
Cir. 1955); Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d,
977, 985 (8th Cir. 1988)).
150. Id. at 745.
This conclusion gives meaning to the language of the insurance policy limiting
coverage to damages for which the insured has become legally obligated, and
to the intentions of the parties regarding risks covered.
Id. (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Neel, 25 Wash. App. 722, 724, 612 P.2d 6, 7-8 (1980)).
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v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.515 In Boeing, the Washington
Supreme Court squarely addressed the issue of whether CER-
CLA response costs are covered within the "as damages"
clause of CGL policies. In a 6-2 ruling, the court rejected the
narrow interpretation of the term "damages" adopted in Ross
and, like the courts in Queen City Farms and Isaacson, looked
to the Washington law of insurance construction to find that
terms in an insurance contract must be interpreted broadly
and in accordance with their plain meaning.
V. BOEING Co. V. AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY Co.
In Boeing, Boeing and the other policyholders152 sued their
insurers in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington for indemnification for the response
costs the companies paid to the EPA for clean up of the West-
ern Processing Facility. Both sides filed motions for summary
judgment. Because the motions raised a determinative ques-
tion of state law, the district court certified the case to the
Washington Supreme Court for a determination of whether
CERCLA response costs are covered damages under CGL poli-
cies.1 53 The majority in Boeing explicitly rejected the narrow
interpretation of the term "damages" and held that response
costs paid to the EPA are "damages" under the CGL policies
issued by Boeing's insurers.1M To reach this conclusion, the
majority reasoned that response costs must be within the plain
meaning of the insurance policy before a policyholder would be
entitled to indemnification from its insurer." Thus, in its well
151. 113 Wash. 2d 869, 784 P.2d 507 (1990).
152. Six cases stemming from hazardous waste contamination at the Western
Processing Facility in Kent, Washington, were consolidated. Boeing Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co. (consolidating Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, Inc. v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co.; RSR Co. v. Granite State Ins. Co. and American Centennial Ins. Co.;
John Fluke Manufacturing Co., v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.; Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co. v. John Fluke Manufacturing Co.; Davis Walker Co. v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co.).
153. Id. at 873, 784 P.2d at 509. The district court certified the following question
to the supreme court: "Whether, under Washington law, the environmental response
costs paid or to be paid by the insureds, as the result of action taken by the United
States and the State of Washington under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et. seq., constitute
'damages' within the meaning of the comprehensive general liability policies issued by
the insureds."
154. Id at 887, 784 P.2d at 516.
155. Id. at 875, 784 P.2d at 510. The court applied a particularly objective test to
determine the plain meaning of the insurance policy and specifically noted the absence
of public policy in the construction of insurance contracts:
While this case implicitly presents a grave question of policy, namely who
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reasoned opinion, the court adopted the primary method of
analysis used by courts that have found in favor of coverage:
the plain meaning rule."~
To determine whether response costs should be considered
damages within the CGL policy, the Washington Supreme
Court first analyzed the structure of the policy itself.157
Because the policies in question contained variations on the
standard "as damages" language, the court looked within the
document for a definition of the term "damages." Neither the
exclusionary clause nor the definition section clarified the
term. After determining that the term "damages" was not
defined within the four corners of the insurance policy, the
majority turned to the plain meaning rule to provide adefinition."s
Citing the commonly accepted pronouncement of the plain
meaning rule, the court stated that undefined terms in an
insurance contract are given their plain, ordinary, and popular
meaning.159 The majority noted that the plain meaning of a
term is determined by its standard dictionary definition. Stan-
dard dictionaries, the majority found, uniformly define the
word "damages" inclusively, without making any distinction
between sums awarded on a legal or equitable basis."s
Because standard dictionaries do not limit damages to legal
remedies, the majority concluded that the plain meaning of the
term "damages" includes both legal and equitable claims for
should bear the cost of polluting our environment, the task presently before
this court only requires us to construe the terms of the policies under
Washington law. Washington courts rarely invoke public policy to override
express terms of an insurance policy.
Id. at 876, 784 P.2d at 510 n.1.
156. Id. at 876-77, 784 P.2d at 511. For a discussion of the two methods of analysis
most frequently employed be courts finding in favor of coverage, see supra text
accompanying notes 73-100. Although the court in Boeing relied on the plain meaning
rule, it did give passing notice to the reasoning that the distinction between legal
damages and equitable relief is irrelevant. The court explicitly cited the ruling in
United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 336 N.W.2d 838
(1983), which chided the fortuitous distinction between whether the state cleans up
and sues to recover clean-up costs or whether it compels the polluter to incur clean-up
costs. Boeing, 113 Wash. 2d at 879, 784 P.2d at 512.
157. Id. at 876-77, 784 P.2d at 511.
158. Id. at 877, 784 P.2d at 511.
159. Id. at 877, 784 P.2d at 511.
160. Id. at 877, 784 P.2d at 511. In fact, even the insurers own dictionaries defined
"damages" in accordance with the ordinary, popular, lay understanding. Id. at 877-78,
784 P.2d at 511.
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relief.161
By adopting the plain meaning analysis, the majority in
Boeing rejected the narrow interpretation of the term "dam-
ages" and the various case law that supports that definition.
The majority noted that virtually all previous courts finding
against coverage relied on the narrow, technical interpretation
of damages first established by the Fifth Circuit in Aetna Casu-
alty & Surety Co. v. Hanna.62 In Boeing, the majority argued
that the Hanna interpretation of damages is inconsistent with
Washington law.'83 As the majority explained, Washington
law prohibits imputing a technical definition to a contract term
unless both parties intended the term to have such a mean-
ing." Unless the parties otherwise agree, courts interpret a
word in an insurance contract in accordance with the meaning
the average insurance purchaser would give the word.16 The
text of Boeing's insurance contract contained no indication that
the parties intended the term "damages" to have any definition
other than its ordinary definition."6 Because the policy did not
indicate any contrary intent of the parties, the Boeing majority
held that the standard dictionary definition of damages should
be applied to the contract.16 7 The majority held that a narrow,
technical definition was inappropriate.'6
Although the court rejected the narrow interpretation of
damages as promulgated by Hanna and its progeny, the insur-
ers insisted that the district court's decision in Ross'69 estab-
lished a Washington precedent sufficient to compel the court
161. Id. at 885, 784 P.2d at 515.
162. 224 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1955).
163. Boeing, 113 Wash. 2d at 880, 784 P.2d at 512.
164. Id. at 881-82, 784 P.2d at 513.
165. Id. at 882, 784 P.2d at 513.
166. Upon certification to the Washington Supreme Court, the district court
intended only that the state court answer a question of Washington law; therefore, the
district court did not provide any extrinsic evidence touching upon the parties'
interpretation of the coverage clause. Thus, the court's analysis was limited to the four
corners of the insurance policy. Id. at 877, 784 P.2d at 511. Even if extrinsic evidence
had been available, it is likely that the court would have ruled it inadmissible, because
generally, extrinsic evidence will not be admitted into evidence unless the term is
ambiguous. 19 G. COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw § 79: 143 at 118-19 (2d ed.
1984). Given the court's analysis in this case, it is very likely that it would have
determined that the term "damages" is unambiguous; therefore, any evidence of the
parties' intent outside the insurance policy document would have been inadmissible.
167. Id. at 876-77, 784 P.2d at 511.
168. Id.
169. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ross Electric of Washington, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 742 (W.D.
Wash. 1988).
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to find that a claim for equitable monetary relief cannot consti-
tute a claim for damages.170 The court rejected this argument
as well. In reaching its decision, the court in Ross relied on
Hanna progeny (the reasoning of which had already been
rejected by the Boeing court), and on a single case interpreting
Washington insurance law. According to the majority, that
case, Seaboard Surety Co. v. Ralph Williams' Northwest
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. ," 7 ' did not stand for the proposition
for which it was cited by the insurers.
The court in Ross and the insurers in Boeing interpreted
Seaboard as holding that "damages" do not include sums paid
as restitution.172 In Seaboard, the Seaboard Surety Company
brought a declaratory judgment action to obtain a judicial
determination that the company had no duty to defend an
injunction suit filed by the Washington State Attorney General
against an automobile dealer for unfair competititon.'7 3 The
court in Seaboard upheld the trial court's determination that
the insurer was under no contractual duty to defend the suit
because the complaint did not allege damages for unfair com-
petition and the Attorney General was not authorized by state
statute to recover such costs.1 7 4
Not only did the Boeing majority reject the Ross court's
interpretation of Seaboard, it found that the Ross decision was
of dubious precedential value because the district court was
unaware of the decisions in Queen City Farms and Isaacson
when it made its ruling. After these decisions were brought to
the district court's attention on a motion for rehearing, the
insurer settled the case before the motion was resolved. 75
Thus, the Boeing court concluded that not only did the court in
Ross misapply the Washington law on which it relied, it also
decided the case without the benefit of the reasoning of the
only Washington court to have addressed the interpretation of
170. Boeing, 113 Wash. 2d at 883, 784 P.2d at 514.
171. 81 Wash. 2d 740, 504 P.2d 1139 (1973). The Boeing majority also distinguished
a Washington Court of Appeals decision, Felice v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 42
Wash. App. 352, 711 P.2d 1066 (1985), review denied, 105 Wash. 2d 1014 (1986), upon
which the Ross court relied. See Boeing, 113 Wash. 2d at 895, 784 P.2d at 515 n.4.
Felice, the majority reasoned, involved a proceeding to remove an attorney as guardian
of an estate, and not an action to recover damages. Id. Accordingly, the majority
concluded that the Felice decision is distinguishable on the facts. Id.
172. Boeing, 113 Wash. 2d at 884, 784 P.2d at 514.
173. Seaboard, 81 Wash. 2d at 740-41, 504 P.2d at 1140.
174. Id. at 746-47, 504 P.2d at 1143.
175. Boeing, 113 Wash. 2d at 885, 784 P.2d at 515.
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the "as damages" clause of CGL policies.'76
Having dismissed the insurers' bases for arguing that a
narrow interpretation of the term "damages" is appropriate
under Washington law, the majority concluded that "the plain
meaning of damages does not distinguish between sums
awarded on a 'legal' or 'equitable' basis and that the plain
meaning of damages may include clean-up costs ... ."' As
the Boeing majority noted, the issue of whether CERCLA
response costs are damages within the meaning of a CGL pol-
icy is solely a matter of state contract law.1 78  Washington con-
tract law follows the established principle that clear and
unambiguous language in an insurance contract must be inter-
preted in accordance with the definition that an average person
in the position of the insured would have understood the lan-
guage to mean.1 79  Such an interpretation is a fair, reasonable
construction'80 in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the
term. 81 This definition upholds the insured's reasonable
expectations as to the scope of coverage.8 2 However, even if
the term "damages" is ambiguous, or susceptible to two reason-
able and fair interpretations, 83 Washington law requires the
term to be construed in the manner most favorable to the
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id at 875, 784 P.2d at 510 n.1; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ross Electric of
Washington, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Wash. 1988) ("interpretation of the terms of
[CGLI insurance contract is governed by Washington law); Hazen Paper Co. v. U.S.
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 576 (Mass. 1990) (issue of whether CERCLA clean-up
costs are damages is one of state law). See generally, 2 G. Couch, CYCLOPEDIA OF
INSURANCE LAw § 15:3, at 116 (2d ed. 1984) (as a general rule, construction of an
insurance contract is a matter of law.).
179. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 102 Wash. 2d 477, 480, 687 P.2d 1139,
1142 (1984); Phil Schroeder, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins., 99 Wash. 2d 65, 68, 659 P.2d 509,
511 (1983). Washington courts apply the average layperson standard irrespective of the
insured's expertise in the interpretation of insurance contracts. Under the layperson
standard, the language of an insurance policy is not given a technical interpretation
unless the parties clearly intended the policy language to have a technical meaning.
Thompson v. Ezzell, 61 Wash. 2d 685, 688, 379 P.2d 983, 985 (1963); Zinn v. Equitable
Life Ins. Co., 6 Wash. 2d 379, 381, 107 P.2d 921, 924 (1940). Technical constructions of
policy terms are not favored. 2 G. COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE, at § 15:22, 201-
202 (2d ed. 1984).
180. Phil Schroeder, Inc. v. Globe Ins. Co., 99 Wash. 2d 65, 68, 659 P.2d 509, 511
(1983); Morgan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 86 Wash. 2d 432, 434, 545 P.2d 1193, 1195 (1976).
181. Ames v. Baker, 68 Wash. 2d 713, 716, 415 P.2d 74, 76 (1966). Thompson v.
Ezzell, 61 Wash. 2d 685, 688, 379 P.2d 983, 985 (1963); Selective Logging Co. v. General
Casualty Co. of America, 49 Wash. 2d 347, 351, 301 P.2d 535, 537 (1956).
182. Morgan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 86 Wash. 2d 432, 545 P.2d 1193 (1976).
183. Emerson, 102 Wash. 2d at 484, 687 P.2d at 1144; Morgan, 86 Wash. 2d at 435,
545 P.2d at 1195.
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insured."8  Accordingly, Washington law requires that the
term "damages" within CGL policies must be interpreted
broadly.
The Washington Supreme Court's decision in Boeing is
consistent with the Washington law of insurance construction
and with the policies underlying CERCLA. Insurers have
attempted to limit their liability for pollution-related clean-up
costs by creating an artificial distinction between legal damages
and equitable relief. This distinction, however, is not only
inconsistent with Washington insurance law, it creates need-
less litigation over abstract terms in insurance policies and
undermines the purposes of CERCLA. Although the court in
Boeing correctly interpreted Washington law by finding that
CERCLA clean-up costs are covered damages, the dissent
raises some compelling arguments that reflect the reasoning of
courts that deny coverage. Upon close examination, however,
the dissent's analysis relies on a misinterpretation of Washing-
ton contract law to support its reasoning.
VI. THE BOEING DISSENT: A MISINTERPRETATION OF
WASHINGTON LAW
Chief Justice Callow, joined by Justice Dolliver, wrote a
vigorous dissent arguing that reimbursement of clean-up costs
is not damages within the meaning of the CGL policies in ques-
tion.1" The dissent concluded that CERCLA response costs
are restitutionary in nature, and as such, cannot be considered
damages."s Chief Justice Callow argued that the majority's
finding that such costs are considered damages upsets the rules
of insurance construction and violates precedent."8 7 The dis-
sent reasoned that Washington law limits recovery for prop-
erty damage to the amount necessary to adequately
compensate the injured parties for the loss.l88 Restitutionary
recovery, on the other hand, is based upon a benefitted party's
184. rthompson, 61 Wash. 2d 685, 688, 379 P.2d 983, 985 (quoting Selective Logging
Co. v. General Casualty Co. of America, 49 Wash. 2d 347, 351, 301 P.2d 535, 537 (1956)).
See also Morgan, 86 Wash. 2d at 435, 545 P.2d at 1195 (citing Glen Falls Ins. Co. v.
Vietzke, 82 Wash. 2d 122, 508 P.2d 608 (1973)); Zinn, 6 Wash. 2d at 384, 107 P.2d at 924.
185. Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 888, 784 P.2d 507,
516-17 (1990) (Callow, C.J. and Dolliver, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 890, 784 P.2d at 518.
187. Id. at 888, 784 P.2d at 517.
188. Id. at 889, 784 P.2d at 517 (citing Puget Const. Co. v. Pierce Cty., 64 Wash.2d
453, 392 P.2d 227 (1964)).
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gain.189 Such recovery, according to the dissent, can greatly
exceed the value of harmed property.19°
Using the distinction between damages and restitutionary
recovery as a framework, the dissent analyzed the nature of
recovery under CERCLA.' 9 ' First, the dissent articulated two
methods of recovery under CERCLA: section 107(a)(4)(C) and
section 107(a)(4)(A). 192 According to the dissent, CERCLA
section 107(a)(4)(C), which provides for recovery resulting
from injury to natural resources, is a compensatory remedy
based on "the lesser of the restoration or replacement costs; or
diminution of use values."' 9 3 By contrast, the dissent argued
that the recovery of response costs under section 107(a)(4)(A)
is restitutionary in nature' 94 because this subsection provides
for the restoration of the status quo.'9 5
The distinctions in CERCLA between the recovery for
injury to natural resources and the recovery of response costs,
the dissent reasoned, indicate that response costs under section
107(a)(4)(A) are an equitable rather than a compensatory, or
legal, remedy."9 The dissent based this conclusion on the
restitutionary features of recovery under section 107(a)(4)(A).
First, the dissent argued that liability for response costs is not
dependent upon the occurrence of a release of hazardous sub-
stances, but may precede such a release. 97 Second, it found
that parties may maintain actions for response costs without an
ownership interest in the injured property. 9 Finally, the dis-
sent stated that response costs can greatly exceed the value of
the harmed property.199
Based on these findings, and the apparent contrast
between natural resource damages and response costs, the dis-
sent concluded that response costs are an equitable remedy.
Accordingly, the dissent then analyzed the coverage provisions
189. Id.
190. Id. at 890, 784 P.2d at 517.
191. Id. at 890-92, 784 P.2d at 517-19.
192. See supra note 44.
193. Boeing, 113 Wash. 2d at 891, 784 P.2d at 518 (citing 43 C.F.R. 11.35(6)(2)).
194. Id. at 891-92, 784 P.2d at 518.
195. Id. at 891, 784 P.2d at 518 (quoting Brett, Insuring Against the Innovative
Liabilities and Remedies Created by Superfund, 6 J. ENVTL. L. 1, 35 (1986)).
196. Id. at 892, 784 P.2d at 518.
197. Id. at 892, 784 P.2d at 518 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9604)).
198. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § § 9607(a)(4)(B), 9659 (a)).
199. Id. (citing Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 969 (1988)).
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of typical CGL policies to ascertain whether the policies in
question cover both legal and equitable remedies. In its analy-
sis, the dissent determined that the CGL policies at issue
unambiguously cover only compensatory damage liability and
do not cover restitutionary response cost liability.2" Based on
these conclusions, the dissent then proceeded to parse the rea-
soning of the majority, ultimately determining that the major-
ity had misinterpreted Washington law.
First, the dissent attacked the majority's finding that the
policyholder's subjective understanding of the coverage pro-
vided by CGL policies is determinative of the coverage actually
provided.20 1 The dissent argued that the clear meaning and
purpose of an insurance policy rather than the insured's expec-
tation of coverage, should determine coverage.0 2 The dissent
drew this conclusion after interpreting several Washington
Supreme Court decisions as having ignored the insured's sub-
jective expectation of coverage.' 3 Based on this interpretation
of Washington law, the dissent concluded that an insured's
subjective understanding of the scope of the "as damages"
clause is irrelevant.2'
Second, the dissent argued that the Washington Supreme
Court explicitly rejected structural ambiguity as a doctrine of
contract interpretation.0" Rather, the dissent contended that
the absence of exclusionary language limiting the scope of
damages indicates that the policies extended coverage only to
amounts the insurer is legally obligated to pay "as damages."
Finally, the dissent argued that, within the CGL policies
issued by Aetna and the other insurers, the phrase "as dam-
ages" plainly refers to compensation for injuries.2° According
to the dissent, although the standard dictionary definition of.
damages does not distinguish between legal and equitable
relief, the definition establishes "damages" as reparation for
detriment or injury sustained.20 7 Because CERCLA response
costs under section 107(a)(4)(A) do not constitute reparation,
200. Id. at 893, 784 P.2d at 519.
201. Id. at 894, 784 P.2d at 519.
202. Id. at 894, 784 P.2d at 519-20.
203. Id. (citing Kennen v. Industrial Indem. Ins. Co. of the Northwest, 108
Wash.2d 514, 522, 738 P.2d 270 (1987)) (standing for the proposition that the court has
on several occasions declined to adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations).
204. Id. at 894, 784 P.2d at 520.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 896, 784 P.2d at 521.
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the dissent concluded that these costs do not fall within the
plain meaning of damages.'
Having rejected the majority's analysis of Washington con-
tract law, the dissent attacked the majority's dismissal of Sea-
board Surety Company v. Ralph Williams Northwest Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc.2' The majority rejected the insurer's argu-
ment that Seaboard stands for the proposition that, under
Washington law, the term "damages" does not include restitu-
tionary liabilities.210 The dissent argued that Seaboard stands
for the proposition that an action for injunctive and restitutio-
nary relief is not an action for damages.21 ' Accordingly, the
dissent found that the EPA's recovery of response costs under
CERCLA is a restitutionary form of recovery, and as such,
does not fall within the "as damages" language of typical CGL
policies.21 2
Although the dissent constructed a compelling argument
in favor of denying coverage, it misinterpreted the meaning of
the term "damages" under Washington law by misconstruing
Washington case law and by failing to apply the state's law of
insurance construction. The dissent relied on the holding in
Puget Construction Co. v. Pierce County213 to support this con-
clusion that Washington law has uniformly adopted a narrow
interpretation of the term "damages." 214 The dissents reading
of Puget Construction, however, was erroneous. In Puget Con-
struction the court adopted the narrow interpretation of dam-
ages only to comply with Wash. Rev. Code § 36.45, which
provides for claims against counties. In that case, the court
addressed the issue of whether the term "damages" within the
208. Id.
209. 81 Wash. 2d 740, 504 P.2d 1139 (1973). See supra notes 171-174 and
accompanying text.
210. Boeing, 113 Wash. 2d at 901, 784 P.2d at 523.
211. Id.
212. Id. The dissent argued that the Washington Court of Appeals has found that
an insurer is not required to indemnify an insured's restitutionary liability. Id. at 902,
784 P.2d at 524 (citing Felice v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 42 Wash. App. 352, 357,
711 P.2d 1066 (1985), review denied, 105 Wash. 2d 1014 (1986)). In Felice, an attorney
sought coverage of attorney fees for breach of the insurer's duty to defend the attorney
in an action to remove him as guardian of an estate. Felice, 42 Wash. App. at 356, 711
P.2d at 1068. The Washington Supreme Court determined that the insurer is not
required to defend an insured for mandamus or injunction types of proceedings which
compel the insured to act. Id. at 357, 711 P.2d at 1069 (citing Seaboard, 81 Wash. 2d
740, 504 P.2d 1139 (1973)).
213. 64 Wash. 2d 453, 392 P.2d 227 (1964).
214. Boeing, 113 Wash. 2d at 889, 784 P.2d at 517.
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meaning of the statute included claims arising out of both tort
and contract. 5 The court determined that the statute defined
damages as the sum of money that the law imposes or awards
as compensation for injury done, under either tort or con-
tract.2 1 6 Because the Puget Construction court's narrow defini-
tion of the term "damages" was limited to the terms remaining
within that particular statute, the Boeing dissent erred in
attempting to apply that definition in the context of response
costs under CERCLA.
The dissent also misinterpreted Washington law by declin-
ing to interpret insurance contracts in a manner consistent
with the expectations of the average insured. Specifically, the
dissent cited Nevers v. Aetna Insurance Co. 217 to support its
contention that coverage under an insurance policy does not
correspond to the coverage the insured anticipated, but rather
should be interpreted in accordance with "its clear meaning
and purpose. , Nevers, however, is distinguishable on its
facts. In Nevers, the plaintiff sought indemnification under an
"all risks" yachtsman's hull insurance policy to recover the
cost of a boat which had a defective title.219 The plaintiff's
insurance company interpreted the policy as limiting recovery
to damage to, or physical loss of, the boat caused by fortuitous
and external circumstances but determined that it did not
cover losses incurred through breach of the warranty of
title.220
The Nevers court held that construing the policy in such a
manner, therefore, the court concluded that coverage did not
extend to defects of title.221 Thus, the Nevers decision does not
abandon the practice of interpreting the meaning of the terms
of an insurance policy by looking to the insured's reasonable
expectations of coverage. Rather, the Nevers decision was lim-
ited strictly to the facts of that particular case. Given those
particular facts, the plaintiff in Nevers could not have reason-
ably anticipated coverage. 222
215. Puget Construction, 64 Wash. 2d at 454, 392 P.2d at 228.
216. Id. at 392, P.2d at 230.
217. 14 Wash. App. 906, 546 P.2d 1240 (1976).
218. Boeing, 113 Wash. 2d at 894, 784 P.2d at 519-20.
219. Nevers, 14 Wash. App. at 907, 546 P.2d at 1240.
220. Id. at 907, 546 P.2d at 1240-41.
221. Id. at 903, 546 P.2d at 1241.
222. While a phrase in an insurance policy must be interpreted in accordance with
the way it would be understood by the average man purchasing insurance .... the
phrase should not be isolated and construed by itself without reference to its context
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In their final attack on the reasoning of the majority, the
dissenting justices in Boeing argued that an interpretation of
the "as damages" language that includes CERCLA response
costs violates public policy.223 The dissent reasoned that Con-
gress intended that the parties who financially benefit from
the polluting activities should bear the clean-up costs.22A
According to the dissent, allowing coverage permits polluters
to avoid liability and to reap the financial rewards of their pol-
luting activity, while the insurers bear the financial burden.2
This analysis, however, misinterpreted Congressional
intent behind the enactment of CERCLA. The CERCLA legis-
lative history contains nothing to suggest that Congress
intended for polluters, to the exclusion of their insurers, to pay
for clean-up costs. 226 In fact, Congress intended that CER-
CLA's liability provisions should ensure that the victims of
pollution are not left uncompensated for harm caused by haz-
ardous waste pollution.2" Moreover, Congress enacted CER-
CLA's liability provisions to ensure that "innocent victims"
harmed by hazardous waste pollution do not bear the costs of
cleanup.22 Additionally, Congress intended to provide a rem-
edy for victims of hazardous waste pollution who, in the
absence of CERCLA's liability provisions, would have diffi-
culty seeking redress through the court system.2  Indeed,
actions seeking compensation for pollution-related injuries are
cumbersome, time-consuming and expensive, making recovery
for such damages difficult to obtain.' Thus, while Congress
intended that CERCLA accomplish the task of cleaning up
environmental pollution, it did not specifically provide, nor
intend, that polluters, rather than insurers, pay for the cleanup
of hazardous waste sites.
In addition, the dissent fails to consider that there are
other mechanisms within an insurance policy by which a pol-
or the purpose of the provisions in which the phrase is contained. Id. at 908, 546 P.2d
at 1241.
223. Boeing, 113 Wash. 2d at 905, 784 P.2d at 525.
224. Id. at 906, 784 P.2d at 526.
225. Id.
226. S. RPT. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 98, reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T
& PUB. WoRKs, Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,




230. Id. at 320.
[Vol. 14:311
Boeing Co. v. Aetna
luter may be held liable.2 31 Manipulating state contract law to
interpret the "as damages" clause in favor of insurers simply
engenders litigation and confusion, particularly when there are
more appropriate clauses under which coverage could be
denied if such denial is appropriate.
VII. CONCLUSION
Through the establishment of Superfund, Congress
intended to provide a mechanism to promote the cleanup of
hazardous waste sites.23 2 By providing a mechanism through
which the government can require the cleanup of these sites-
and the appropriations to finance these cleanups-Congress
took a definitive step toward solving our nation's hazardous
waste crisis. This crisis, however, has only grown since 1980
when CERCLA was enacted.
The government, through its own efforts, cannot solve this
crisis: it has neither the resources nor the funds to effectively
combat the ever-increasing amount of hazardous waste leaking
into the environment. Engaging polluters in the clean-up pro-
cess is the only effective means of combating this crisis. Wash-
ington courts have specifically recognized that effective
hazardous waste cleanup must involve cooperation between
the EPA and the parties responsible for the pollution.233
Accordingly, polluters should be given clear signals that they
are, in fact, responsible for cleaning up contamination of pollu-
tion they generated.
Currently, however, this type of cooperation is nonexis-
tent. Polluters and insurers are slow to clean up hazardous
waste sites-preferring to wait until the extent of their liabil-
ity has been determined through litigation.2  Thus, litigation
over the currently unresolved "as damages" issue, in effect,
discourages and delays voluntary cleanups while insurers seek
a favorable judicial determination.2
A definitive judicial determination in favor of coverage for
clean-up costs will promote voluntary cleanup. Businesses
231. See supra note 24.
232. See supra note 14.
233. Queen City Farms v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 86-2-06236-0 (King
County Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 1987), reported in Mealey's Litigation Reports-Insurance
A-106, A-108 (Nov. 24, 1987).
234. Id.
235. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1193 (9th
Cir. 1988).
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purchase CGL policies in order to limit their liability for busi-
ness-related damage. These policies should cover loss or dam-
age caused by any event not explicitly excluded from coverage.
Had the insurers intended to limit the term "damages" to
strictly legal damages, the CGL policies should have included
such an exclusion. However, because CGL policies do not limit
coverage to legal damages, purchasers of these insurance poli-
cies should reasonably be able to expect coverage for all unan-
ticipated liability arising from the activities of business.
Imputing a technical definition of damages years after a
policy was negotiated is contrary to the fundamental principles
of contract law. Moreover, the drafting history of CGL policies
demonstrates that even though the policies do not explicitly
define the term "damages," the insurers assumed that CGL
policies provided coverage for clean-up costs.236 Because insur-
ers did not expressly limit their liability, and, in fact, expected
to cover CERCLA response costs, insurers should not, at this
later date, be allowed to limit liability for costs that should be
covered damages.237 Thus, coverage will effectively compen-
sate for liabilities which both the insured and the insurer could
have reasonably expected to be covered damages. Ultimately,
providing coverage for CERCLA response costs will fulfill the
basic purpose of insurance-which is to insure.3 8
Kimberly A. Richter
236. In Shell Oil Co. v. Accident & Casualty Insurance Co. of Winterthur, No.
27852, (San Mateo County, Cal. Super. Ct. July 13, 1988), the court considered
testimony and documentary evidence which indicated that insurers did not intend the
term "damages" to have a special or technical meaning within CGL policies. Id at 79.
Shell Oil is the only case wherein the court considered extrinsic evidence pertaining to
the insurers' intent and understanding of the term "damages" within CGL policies.
LATHROP, supra note 17, at 195. The court in Shell Oil relied on the "testimony of
underwriters and drafters of the insurance provisions." I&i at 76.
237. In fact, the court in Boeing argued that the insurance industry can include
exclusionary language and conditions in insurance policies. Boeing Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 887, 784 P.2d 507, 516 (1990).
238. Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Davis, 44 Wash. App. 161, 164, 721 P.2d 550, 551
(1986).
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